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ABSTRACT 
Companies have been unbundling their products: they have been selling 
products and services separately that were traditionally sold together. In 
doing so, they have raised their profits. This paper uses a model to show how 
companies can use unbundling to increase profits and decrease competition. 
Unbundling raises problems when it increases information cost, information 
asymmetry, and barriers to entry. This paper also discusses the U.S. case law 
that has grasped with these issues of bundling and unbundling.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bundling refers to the strategy of selling multiple products together as 
one product in fixed proportions.1 Legally, bundling is treated as a tying 
arrangement: “an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the 
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least 
agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.”2 
In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, Justice O’Connor 
wrote a concurring opinion where she provided an easy-to-apply definition 
for what constitutes an anticompetitive tying arrangement.3 She stated that 
three elements must be present: (1) “the seller must have power in the tying 
product market”;4 (2) “there must be a substantial threat that the tying seller 
will acquire market power in the tied-product market”;5 (3) “there must be a 
coherent economic basis for treating the tying and tied products as distinct.”6 
Justice O’Connor did not find an anticompetitive tying when a patient sued 
a hospital claiming that the hospital tied anesthesia and surgical services.7 
While discussed as a tying arrangement, Jefferson Parish was a 
bundling case. Bundling is tying in fixed proportions.8 “Bundling is the 
practice of offering, for a single price, two or more goods or services that 
could be sold separately. A bundled discount occurs when a firm sells a 
bundle of goods or services for a lower price than the seller charges for the 
goods or services purchased individually.”9 
Bundling is a form of second-degree price discrimination.10 The firm 
offers a menu of offers and lets the consumer self-select their preferred 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 William James Adams & Janet L. Yellen, Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly, 90 
Q.J. ECON. 475, 475 (1976) (“A firm that sells goods only in package form has adopted a pure bundling 
strategy.”). 
2 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958). 
3 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37–39 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
4 Id. at 37. 
5 Id. at 38. 
6 Id. at 39. 
7 Id. at 46. 
8 LePage’s Inc. v. 3M (Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that 
bundling discounts “are best compared with tying, whose foreclosure effects are similar”). 
9 Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 894 (9th Cir. 2008). 
10 See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142–52 (1988). 
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offer.11 This selection reveals information about the consumer’s type.12 Firms 
often struggle to set up such a menu that encourages revealing one’s 
preferences and avoiding arbitrage (i.e. incentive compatible). Second degree 
price discrimination has welfare ambiguous effects because companies can 
react in different ways if they are not able to price discriminate.13 
Justice O’Connor’s definition did not show that tying and bundling 
threatened welfare in every market. Instead, it showed a worry that tying and 
bundling could be used to leverage one monopoly into another market. Since 
the Jefferson Parish ruling, antitrust bundling cases have focused on the use 
of bundles to leverage market power into a secondary market to gain market 
power and exclude others.14 Absent the ability to monopolize, tying and 
bundling should be allowed. 
Cases like LePage’s Inc. v. 3M15 and Cascade Health Solutions v. 
PeaceHealth16 look at how bundles can be used to exclude competitors. First, 
the Third Circuit in LePage’s refused to rule that the bundling rebate was 
anticompetitive only if the bundle discount meant a below-cost pricing 
argument.17 Instead, the Third Circuit advocated a rule of reason where a 
defendant could introduce procompetitive justifications.18 
The Ninth Circuit in Cascade Health did not endorse the LePage’s 
standard.19 Instead, the court reverted to the predatory below-cost approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp.20 The court adopted that “a plaintiff who challenges a package 
discount as anticompetitive must prove that, when the full amount of the 
discounts given by the defendant is allocated to the competitive product or 
products, the resulting price of the competitive product or products is below 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 Id. at 143. 
12 See, e.g., id. at 153. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 485 (9th ed. 2014). 
13 See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 12, at 485–87. 
14 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in 
Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 487–95 
(2009) (discussing the exclusionary approach for bundles under case law). 
15 See generally LePage’s Inc. v. 3M (Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co.), 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
16 See generally Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008). 
17 LePage’s, 324 F.3d at 152. 
18 Id. 
19 Cascade Health, 515 F.3d at 910. 
20 Id. at 900–03 (citing Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
222 (1993)). 
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the defendant’s incremental cost to produce them.”21 This test is known as 
the discount attribution test; hence, failing this test makes the bundling per 
se illegal. 
Professor Dillbary discussed these and other tests, including the Ortho 
Diagnostic System, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. test22 and Antitrust 
Modernization Commission test.23 Using examples, he showed that these 
tests are all under- and over-inclusive if the aim of the antitrust laws is to 
increase societal welfare.24 He found that bundling can be used to price 
discriminate and increase company profits but consumers and society at large 
can benefit as well.25 He concluded that bundling requires a case-by-case 
basis analysis and extensive information about costs.26 
Some companies have resorted to the opposite strategy: unbundling. 
They offer complementary products or services that were once offered 
together but now are offered separately. This unbundling strategy has been 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 Id. at 909. 
22 The Ortho Diagnostic decision adopted the Brooke Group below-cost pricing for bundle discount 
to show that an injury occurred. Ortho Diagnostic System, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 
455, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But the court was also worried about the possible foreclosure effect and found 
that “the fact that [the defendant] has priced each component of its package above average variable cost 
is not alone sufficient to protect it from Section 2 liability.” Id. at 469. Thus, the court ruled that a plaintiff 
must “prove either that (a) the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is 
at least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the defendant, but that the defendant’s pricing 
makes it unprofitable for the plaintiff to continue to produce.” Id. at 469. The United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York’s recommendation is an attribution test with an alternative for 
showing efficiency harm. The District Court dismissed the case because the plaintiff had failed to show 
that that “the pricing in the five [products] package is [not] such that incremental net revenue from selling 
the two additional [products] is greater than the revenue forgone as a result of the price cuts of the original 
three [products].” Id. at 470. Because “it is impossible to determine from the evidence submitted by Ortho 
whether a rigorous application of [its] compensatory pricing theory would yield the conclusion that 
Abbott’s pricing fell within or without the bounds of Section 2.” “Accordingly, the compensatory pricing 
argument is insufficient to defeat this motion, and Abbott is entitled to summary judgment dismissing all 
of Ortho’s Section 2 claims relating to the pricing of [these products].” Id. at 471. 
23 See generally J. Shahar Dillbary, Predatory Bundling and the Exclusionary Standard, 67 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1231 (2010); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/reportrecommendation/amcfinalreport 
.pdf. The AMC tri-part test requires the plaintiff to show that: “(1) after allocating all discounts and rebates 
attributable to the entire bundle of products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the competitive 
product below its incremental cost for the competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these 
short-term losses; and (3) the bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an adverse 
effect on competition.” Dillbary, supra, at 1246 n.67; Cascade Health, 515 F.3d at 900. 
24 See generally Dillbary, supra note 23, at 1258–78. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. at 1278–82. 
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successful because, in many cases, these services are personal and cannot be 
arbitraged. Examples range far: restaurants charging separately for food and 
services; airlines separating passenger and luggage transport; furniture 
companies charging separately for parts and assembly; etc. 
Unbundling can take two forms: a mixed bundle or an “add-ons” 
strategy. Mixed bundle refers to the strategy of offering the same products 
bundled and unbundled.27 Add-ons are additional products or services 
offered after the purchase of the first good or service.28 
Like bundling, unbundling can raise anti-competitive concerns such as 
exclusion and price discrimination. Unbundling can also raise consumer 
protection problems. This Article offers a simple and elegant model to show 
how unbundling can be harmful. 
This Article discusses some harmful effects of unbundling. Section 2 
looks at the law and economics of unbundling. Building on the traditional 
Bertrand model, the model can show that unbundling enables companies to 
enjoy positive economic profits even when they face perfect competition. 
Section III looks at how unbundling can be used to harm competition and 
consumers. Unbundling can be used to increase barriers to entry, which raises 
anti-competition concerns. Unbundling can also be used to decrease 
competition through product differentiation and lock-in effects. Unbundling 
can also harm consumers by decreasing product transparency. Finally, 
unbundling can be used to address other issues, such as the principal-agent 
problem, but face unintended consequences. Section IV concludes that two 
types of unbundling should be considered and treated differently. Based on 
these differences, unbundling companies should face different presumptions 
in court. 
II. PROFIT MAKING UNBUNDLING 
Companies bundle products to increase profits. For example, a company 
faces two types of consumers and sells two products (see Table 1). Type A 
consumers value product 1 at $x and product 2 at $y. Type B consumers value 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 “A firm that sells the same goods separately as well as in packages has adopted a mixed bundling 
strategy.” Adams & Yellen, supra note 1, at 475. 
28 Glenn Ellison, A Model of Add-on Pricing, 120 Q.J. ECON. 585, 585 (2005) (“In many businesses 
it is customary to advertise a base price for a product and to try to sell additional ‘add-ons’ at high prices 
at the point of sale. […] . In some cases, add-ons can be thought of as a classic price discrimination 
strategy: the base good and the base good plus the add-on are two different quality levels.”). 
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product 1 at $y and product 2 at $x. Assume that 0 < x < y and marginal costs 
for each product is 0. If the company charges $x for product 1, both A and B 
type consumers would be willing to purchase it. If the company charges $y 
for product 1, only B type consumers are willing to purchase it. Similarly, if 
the company charges $x for product 2, both A and B type consumers are 
willing to purchase it. If the company charges $y for product 2, only A type 
consumers are willing to purchase it. If the company sells each product at $x 
(or $2x together), both types are willing to purchase both goods. But selling 
together at $x + y also ensures that both types are willing to purchase the 
bundle. The company would be better off bundling. 
 
Table 1: The revenue upsides of bundling 
 
 Willing to pay of 
type A consumer 
Willing to pay of type 
B consumer 
Product 1 x y 
Product 2 y x 
Bundling Product 1 and 2 x + y x + y 
 
In the context of an “add-on,” the company could offer the first product 
purchased—regardless of whether it is product 1 or 2—at $y and, once the 
consumer purchased the first product, the company could let consumers 
purchase the second product—the one not previously purchased—at $x. This 
pricing system is akin to a flexible add-on strategy. Mixed bundling involves 
a simultaneous or sequential purchasing decision whereas add-ons are a 
sequential purchasing decision. 
Most researchers have looked at bundling focusing on monopolists and 
on whether monopolists can leverage this market power.29 Monopolists can 
deploy this strategy to extract more profits or also to exclude others. 
Consumers can benefit from this strategy because they can gain access to 
products they may not have been able to afford without the bundle. 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 See, e.g., Dillbary, supra note 23, at 1251–53; Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 
ANTITRUST BULL. 321, 340 (2005); Michael D. Whinston, Tying Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 837, 855 (1990). 
 
8 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 39:XX 
 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.206 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Some researchers looked at bundling in a competitive environment. For 
example, Professor Nalebuff looked at bundling in an oligopolistic 
environment when an incumbent tries to deter entry of a competitor or when 
they try to raise profits.30 
When bundling is found to be anticompetitive, the traditional remedy 
enjoins the companies from bundling. The model below shows how 
unbundling could also have welfare harming effects even if deployed in a 
competitive environment. 
A. Model of Unbundling 
The unbundling examples discussed in this section look like add-ons: at 
a restaurant, I do not want service without the food; in court, I do not want a 
barrister without previously speaking with a solicitor; in airlines, I do not 
want to travel without my luggage; in a hospital, I do not want a surgery 
without anesthesia; etc. The model below builds on the traditional Bertrand 
duopoly model and shows how companies can use unbundling to increase 
profits and decrease competition. 
The basic Bertrand model involves two identical firms {i, j} selling 
homogenous products with marginal cost of product c. No other company 
can enter the market. The companies are competing over price p that they 
independently set. 
Consumers purchase one unit of the good and purchase from whoever 
offers the cheapest good. In other words, the demand Di that firm i faces for 
the good is: 
𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝  =  ⎩⎨
⎧ 𝐷 𝑝  if 𝑝 < 𝑝12 𝐷 𝑝  if 𝑝  =  𝑝0 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  
 
The Nash equilibrium of the classic Bertrand model occurs where the price 
p is set equal to marginal cost i.e. pi = pj = c because at this price no firm can 
do better by deviating alone. An independent price increase does not increase 
the firm’s profit because the demand drops to zero. If the firm i increases its 
price above c, all consumers would purchase from j instead. An independent 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q.J. ECON. 159, 161–64 (2004). 
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price decrease leads to negative revenue per unit. If the firm i decreases its 
price below c, all consumers would purchase from i but firm i would lose on 
each unit (p - c). By symmetry, the same reasoning applies to firm j. Any 
other pricing alternatives lead to one or both of the two firms wanting to 
deviate.31 At equilibrium, the two firms split the demand: firm i’s demand is 𝐷 𝑝 . Its profit are zero because they price at (marginal) cost. 
The Bertrand model leads to the perfectly competitive outcome, even 
with only two firms. The usual solution to this extreme competition would 
be for the firms to differentiate their products so that the consumers do not 
just purchase the cheapest product. Product differentiation would allow the 
firms to exercise some market power. 
Assume now that the product can be divided into an initial product (e.g., 
airfare for the traveler) and a possible add-on (e.g., checked bag transport). 
The respective marginal costs of the product and add-on are c1 and c2. 
Assume that the company faces two types of consumers: 
(1) sophisticated type; and (2) naïve types. 
These consumers consider purchasing one unit of both goods. 
Sophisticated consumers look at the bundle price (i.e. the price of the initial 
product and its add-ons together). Naïve consumers only compare the price 
of the initial product and then they decide to purchase the add-on after being 
locked in. Naïve consumers can also be seen as optimistic because they do 
not believe they will need the add-on in the future (e.g., a consumer who 
believes a carry-on will be sufficient but fails to pack accordingly) or as 
myopic because they value the present so much they do not consider the 
future. 
The sophisticated consumers always buy from the company who offers 
the cheapest bundle: the consumer buys from firm i if 𝑝 + 𝑝 < 𝑝 +𝑝 ⟺ 𝛽 < 𝛽 , where p2i and p2j are respectively the price of good 2 from 
firm i and j and βi and βj are respectively the price of the bundle from firm i 
and j such that β = p1 + p2. 
The naïve consumers always buy from the company who offers the 
cheapest initial good: the consumer buys from firm i if p1i < p1j and, after that, 
they purchase the add-on based on the offered price. 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 See JEFFREY R. CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC 
APPROACH 170, 231–82 (2000), for a discussion of the basic Bertrand model. 
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The demand for firm i’s products Di (p1i, p2i, p1j, p2j) are: 
 





⎪⎧ 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽  =  𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝  =  𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝  =  𝑝  and 𝛽  =  𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝  =  𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽  =  𝛽0 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽
  
 
where DN (p1i, p2i, βi, βj) is the demand for naïve consumers and DS (βi, βj) is 
the demand for sophisticated consumers. 
Contrary to the Bertrand model, this model does not have a pure strategy 
Nash Equilibrium (see Appendix). Specifically, unlike the Bertrand model, 
firms pricing at marginal cost (i.e. βi = βj = c1 + c2 or p1i = p1j = c1 and 
p2i = p2j = c2) is not a Nash Equilibrium. 
If the companies i and j were to price at marginal cost (i.e. p1i = p1j = c1 
and p2i = p2j = c2), they would make zero profits. But they could be better off 
by deviation alone. While increasing the price of good 1 does increase profit, 
increasing the price of good 2 would increase a firm’s profit. 
Increasing the price of the original product (p1i) would imply losing the 
demand from every consumer. If the company wants to retain the demand 
from the sophisticated consumers, it could decrease the price of the add-on 
(p2i) to keep the bundle price at the same level (βi = c1 + c2). Such strategy 
does not however increase profits. Therefore, increasing the price of the 
original product does not improve firm i’s situation. 
Increasing the price of the add-on product (p2i) would imply losing the 
demand from the sophisticated consumers but the firm would retain half the 
demand from the naïve consumers. The company now earns positive profits 
on the high-type naïve consumers because the bundle price (βi > c1 + c2) 
exceeds its cost. Therefore, increasing the price of the add-on product 
improves firm i’s situation. 
Figure 1 depicts the profit Πi of firm i as a function of the add-on price 
if the add-on is a normal good. Firm i makes no earning on the original good 
still priced at p1i = c1. The firm never prices the add-on below cost because, 
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at this point, it would be better off not offering it at all (i.e. outside 
opportunity of zero). As the price of the add-on increases, fewer naïve high-
type consumers buy the add-on product but, despite the loss of the 
inframarginal consumer for the add-on, the firm starts earning positive profits 
from the consumers who still purchase the good above marginal cost. 
Eventually, the profit decreases as the price increase leads to more losses 
from consumers refusing to buy the add-on than additional profits from the 
consumers still purchasing the add-on. Firm i would prefer to price 𝑝 =𝑝  than price at p2i = c2.32 
 
Figure 1: Profit for firm i as a function of the add-on price 
However, p1i = p1j = c1, p2j = c2 & 𝑝 = 𝑝  is not a stable 
equilibrium. At this price, firm j would be better off increasing the price for 
good 2, p2j. It will undercut 𝑝   by the smallest possible margin: firm j 
would charge 𝑝  for the add-on such that 𝑝 = 𝑝 𝜀, where ε is the 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 This assumes that the demand from high-type naïve is positive for some p2i > c2 then 𝑝 = 𝑝  
where , , , = 𝑐 . 
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smallest price increment possible. This strategy ensures that firm j retains the 
whole demand from sophisticated consumers and yet make positive profits 
from these consumers and the naïve consumers as well. 
Again, this strategy is not a stable equilibrium. At this price, firm i 
would be better off undercutting firm j by the smallest possible margin (such 
that 𝑝 = 𝑝 𝜀 = 𝑝 2𝜀) to try to capture the whole demand from 
sophisticated consumers. This iterative process keeps going until the price 
for the add-on for either firm reaches a certain point where undercutting 
becomes not as profitable as charging the maximum price 𝑝 . This price 
is showed on as 𝑝  on Figure 2—the two demands are assumed to be 
identical but for the naïve type’s myopic attribute. 
 
Figure 2: Profit for firm i as a function of the add-on price and when 
undercutting the competition 
 
The process follows an Edgeworth price cycle, but the price never drops 
down to the marginal cost. The unbundling ensures that both companies 
make profits because they can exploit the naïve consumer lock-in effects. 
Both firms may try attracting more naïve consumers by decreasing the 
price of the first good p1. Eventually, the firms would decrease the price of 
the first good to zero (i.e., p1i = p1j = 0), they both would attract half the naïve 
consumers and then they would price the bundles βi and βj above cost (i.e. 
βi ≥ c1 + c2 and βj ≥ c1 + c2). 
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The model could be made more realistic by keeping the two consumer 
types (i.e., the high types) and adding a third type: a low type consumer who 
only purchases the initial good from the company offering the cheapest initial 
good. Adding this consumer type ensures that the firms would be 
incentivized to price the first good above costs (p1i ≥ c1 and p1j ≥ c1); 
however, this assumption does not improve its intuitive results (see 
Appendix). 
The ratio of sophisticated to naïve consumers affects the range over 
which the Edgeworth price cycle occurs. Depending on the width of this 
range, it may be easier for the companies to implicitly coordinate because 
they have less room to price the bundle. 
If all the consumers are sophisticated, then the model reverts to the 
classic Bertrand model. The two firms would compete fiercely over price: 
they would price at marginal cost and produce the socially efficient output. 
Unbundling serves the same purpose as a product differentiation. If the 
companies cannot unbundle, then they compete in the classic Bertrand model 
and the firms would price at marginal cost. If the companies can unbundle, 
then competition decreases, firms exercise some market power over the 
captured naïve consumers, and homogenous goods are differentiated without 
resorting to actual product differentiation or trademark. 
B. Ambiguous Welfare Effect 
This model shows how competing companies can use unbundling to 
profit the same way monopolists have been accused of using bundling to 
profit. Firms select the optimal strategy for the demand they face. A company 
bundles or unbundles because (it believes) it can profit from the strategy. 
However, firms rely on their ability to prevent arbitrage. In all the cases 
discussed above, arbitrage is impossible: add-ons can only be consumed by 
the original purchaser. Most add-ons that follow this model tend to be non-
transferable personal services. A restaurant goer cannot transfer services to 
another consumer if they only want the food. Plaintiff who hired a solicitor 
cannot sell the work of their barrister to another plaintiff. Travelers who only 
want airfare cannot (usually) sell their rights to a suitcase. A patient who got 
anesthesia cannot sell to another patient a hospital’s surgery services. 
These examples illustrate two types of add-ons: (1) optional add-ons 
and (2) necessary add-ons. Optional add-ons are complementary products 
that some consumers purchase while others do not (e.g., luggage and air 
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travel). Producers of these products face both low type consumers who would 
purchase only the first good and high type (sophisticated and naïve) 
consumers who would purchase the bundle. Necessary add-ons are 
complementary products that all consumers purchase (e.g., anesthesia and 
surgery). Producers of these products face only high type consumers—
whether naïve or sophisticated—because both products in the bundle must 
be consumed together. 
Adopting this strategy also affects consumer and societal welfare. The 
effect of unbundling on welfare cannot, nonetheless, be generalized.33 On the 
one hand, unbundling could benefit consumers and society at large. 
Unbundling optional add-ons could increase consumer and societal welfare 
by catering to low type consumers. Unbundling necessary add-ons could 
have pro-competitive effects if competition exists in both first and add-on 
product markets. On the other hand, unbundling could harm consumers and 
society at large. Unbundling optional add-ons could harm naïve consumers 
because the price they face increases. Unbundling necessary add-ons could 
have anti-competitive effects and foreclose competition. 
The model above shows that unbundling companies increase prices 
above marginal cost. If priced at marginal cost when the goods were bundled, 
unbundling increases the price for both the sophisticated and naïve 
consumers. But a low type consumer who would only want the first good 
would now be unable to purchase that good at a lower cost. Depending on 
the mix of low/sophisticated/naïve type consumers, consumer and societal 
welfare could be negatively affected by unbundling. 
Empirical investigations of optional add-ons have supported these 
observations. Brueckner et al. looked at the effect of unbundling in the airline 
industry.34 They built a model and found that unbundling could lead to both 
a price increase or decrease.35 Testing empirically, they found that separating 
the transport of passengers from their luggage through a bag fee led to a 
decrease in the pricing for passenger only (low type).36 But, the price 
                                                                                                                           
 
33 In general, unbundling/bundling ambiguously affects societal welfare. See TIROLE, supra note 
10, at 149, for a discussion of the welfare of second-degree price discrimination in general. 
34 Jan K. Brueckner et al., Product Unbundling in the Travel Industry: The Economics of Airline 
Bag Fees, 24 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 457 (2015). 
35 Id. at 461–63. 
36 Id. at 481 (“Although measuring the bag fee’s effect on the different fare types underlying the 
average is problematic, the percentile regressions show that the 25th percentile fare falls by about $7.00 
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decrease did not reflect the full bag fee.37 In other words, those consumers 
who valued the service above the cost saving but below the bag fee were 
harmed by the unbundling of airfare and bag-fee. 
If policymakers were worried about bundling or unbundling, having a 
ban on either would be inefficient.38 Instead, each case needs to be analyzed 
separately—even in the monopoly situation.39 The section below discusses 
when unbundling becomes harmful. 
III. HARMFUL UNBUNDLING  
Unbundling optional add-ons may be rational for companies who try to 
increase profits by pricing to different consumer types. However, it is less 
rational when companies compete in a product bundled with necessary add-
ons. When bundling forecloses competition,40 unbundling increases 
competition. Unbundling allows some companies to enter only one market 
product instead of entering the bundle market. The competition for the first 
product increases even if the competition in the bundle market does not. The 
prices of the bundle may even decrease in response to more competition in 
the product market. 
For example, the unbundling of handset and phone contract could have 
had this effect. Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and Global System 
for Mobiles (GSM) are wireless technologies widely adopted in the 1990s.41 
They were substitute technologies. CDMA had a lock-in feature: consumers 
                                                                                                                           
 
when a bag fee is adopted, an amount equal to about one-half to one-third of the fee. As a result, it appears 
that the full-trip price rises for the average leisure passenger by at least half of the bag fee on trips when 
that passenger checks a bag. Non-bag checkers among leisure passengers, however, benefit from a lower 
fare.”). 
37 See id. 
38 “[B]undling helps to average the reservation values of the two consumer types, whereas in the 
unbundled case, the company is forced to price to the lowest valuation consumers, in order to get them to 
purchase the good.” CHURCH & WARE, supra note 31, at 170. 
39 Adams & Yellen, supra note 1, discussed and modeled the welfare effect of monopoly pricing, 
pure bundling, and mixed bundling. They found that monopolists can be better off using any of the three 
strategies depending on the relationship between willingness to pay and cost of production. They also 
found that “commodity bundling generally leads to welfare losses when compared with perfect 
competition. But this does not imply that banning package selling per se decreases the burden of 
monopoly.” Id. at 494. 
40 See, e.g., Adams & Yellen, supra note 1; Dillbary, supra note 23; Whinston, supra note 29. 
41 Sascha Segan, CDMA vs. GSM: What’s the Difference?, PC MAG UK (May 24, 2019, 3:33 PM), 
https://uk.pcmag.com/news-analysis/11593/cdma-vs-gsm-whats-the-difference. 
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had to get approval from the network service provider, which tied the mobile 
phone to the network. GSM allowed a user to switch phones by switching 
transferable Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards.42 The GSM unbundling 
technology led to more competition in the mobile phone market and fewer 
opportunities for lock-ins. 
The four sub-sections below discuss why companies may decide to 
unbundle when it seems to increase competition. 
A. Unbundling as a Barrier to Entry 
Like bundling, unbundling can be used to foreclose competition. The 
model above assumed that the product could be unbundled at no cost, i.e. 
Cβ = c1+c2. In reality, the cost of selling the bundle could be less than the cost 
of selling two products separately i.e. Cβ < c1 + c2. Selling a bundle requires 
less packaging, storage, and marketing, or simply enables companies to 
create economics of scope. If unbundling is costly, a market leader could use 
that strategy to foreclose competition. 
A market leader who unbundles may force competitors to unbundle. A 
competitor may want to make their proposition more comparable to the 
market leader. To do so, they would follow similar strategy. When 
unbundling, the competitors need to carry multiple separate products instead 
of a single product. This broader product line raises the competitor’s costs. 
This broader product line also segments the market as shown above. 
This segmentation would not improve competition because any company 
who wants to enter one segment would have to enter both segments. For 
example, in the model above, a third entrant who only wants to sell the bundle 
would never attract the naïve type. Thus, this entrant could miss out on a 
large section of the market. 
Competitors can unbundle to segment a market to create an artificial 
barrier to entry. Competitors may even agree to unbundle to have two 
different markets and divide the markets into potential monopolies. These 
competitors may even use legal means to make their commitment 
enforceable. 




2020] HARMFUL UNBUNDLING 17 
 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.206 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
For example, in the UK, lawyers are divided between barristers and 
solicitors. The original split has been attributed to economic reasons and class 
relations.43 Barristers are litigators while solicitors perform most other 
functions. This unbundling of legal services was formalized in the law.44 
“The historical split of functions fostered a quasi-contractual agreement 
between the branches to divide territories, giving each a monopoly over their 
respective field of trade.”45 This division creates a double marginalization for 
any client who wishes to hire a barrister after consulting a solicitor. 
This unbundling creates redundancies when a case requires the 
involvement of a solicitor and a barrister. Some scholars and practitioners 
have seen this unbundling as inefficient and have attempted to fuse the 
professions (i.e. bundle legal services)—to little avail.46 
Some entities practice unbundling to harm competitors and prevent 
them from competing. For example, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp. was a rare instance where the U.S. Supreme Court found that a 
refusal to deal violated the Antitrust laws.47 Aspen Highlands and three other 
ski resorts were in a joint venture that offered interchangeable bundled tickets 
to all four resorts. After breaking the joint venture, the other three resorts 
refused to sell tickets for their resorts to the Highlands resort—including 
selling tickets at retail price.48 The three resorts unbundled the tickets and 
attempted to prevent its competitors from bundling the tickets again.49 The 
Supreme Court ruled that, in this rarest of circumstances, a refusal to deal 
could amount to an antitrust violation.50 
This case shows how an unbundling from the standpoint of bundled 
offers can harm competitors. They created a marketing joint venture between 
their competing products. Once the product is successful, the dominant firm 
unbundled to prevent competitors from competing on equal footing. 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: Preliminary Reflections on the 
History of the Split English Legal Profession and the Fusion Debate (1000–1900 AD), 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1357, 1358 (2002). 
44 See id. at 1360–61. 
45 Id. at 1364. 
46 Judith L. Maute, Revolutionary Changes to the English Legal Profession or Much Ado About 
Nothing?, 17 PROF. L. 1, 7 (2006) (discussing the debate around fusion of the two professions). 
47 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
48 Id. at 589, 593. 
49 Id. at 592. 
50 Id. at 611. 
18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 39:XX 
 
Vol. 39, No. 1 (2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.206 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Eventually, the dominant companies could have taken over the business of 
the competitors. 
B. Unbundling as a Source of Information Asymmetry 
Bundling is treated as a tying arrangement, which can be illegal under a 
rule of reason if used to attempt to monopolize the tied market. As discussed 
above, unbundling can raise similar issues; however, unbundling can open 
the door to other problems that may trigger consumer protection laws. 
As discussed in the model, companies can profit from unbundling if 
naïve consumers are present in the market. Competition is not well suited to 
dealing with this problem. This issue arose in a patent ambush case. Patent 
ambush is a practice where a patent holder does not disclose to a standard 
setting organization that its patent is essential to a specific standard and then 
contends the patent is infringed by the adopted standard. Many standards 
were created by a single entity (e.g., Betamax, VHS, CD, etc.), who then 
would license their patents through a patent pool. But as technology became 
more complicated, more standards have been set through standard setting 
organizations that require standard setting participants to declare all standard 
essential patents. 
Without patent pools which bundle patents, patents are licensed by 
individual patent holders. A patent holder’s non-declaration of essentiality 
creates information asymmetries, but the competition laws can prove 
ineffective. For example, in Rambus Inc. v. FTC, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) sought to enjoin Rambus from charging non-fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory royalties to standard adopters based on 
hidden patents.51 The DC Circuit Court dismissed the case because the FTC 
did not prove that the standard would not have been adopted, even if Rambus 
did not agree to the royalties it collected (i.e., no harm was proven).52 
Consumer protection problems arise when companies try to turn some 
sophisticated consumers into naïve consumers by increasing the cost of 
gathering information. In economic terms, companies create information 
asymmetries that can be leveraged into higher profits. 
                                                                                                                           
 
51 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 459 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
52 Id. at 467. 
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Such profit seeking companies can make discovering the price of the 
add-on costly. For example, the information may only be available after the 
purchase or buried into fine print. Ellison modeled the add-on pricing model 
and found that not advertising the prices of add-ons can be profitable for 
companies.53 He found that there is a welfare effect trade-off.54 In other 
words, companies can use opacity to their advantage. 
This rent-seeking strategy would negatively affect societal welfare. It 
increases the cost of doing business and inefficiencies because consumers 
must either spend more to purchase the same products without more benefits 
or rely on beliefs about the bundling situation based on previous interactions 
with a seller or its competitors. 
Unbundling may allow companies to take advantage of consumers who 
fail to look at the “updated” fine prints. Some consumer protection authorities 
have viewed this as fraud—particularly if the add-on cost was added after the 
consumer purchased the first product. For example, Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM), the Italian Competition Authority, has 
taken this position in the unbundling of human transportation and carry-on 
luggage. AGCM fined Ryanair and Wizz Air €3 million and €1 million for 
following this unbundling strategy. It found that this strategy aims at 
deceiving consumers about the airline ticket price.55 
Ryanair claimed that charging for carry-on luggage deterred passengers 
from bringing anything on board, making the boarding process faster.56 
However, the problem of delayed boarding due to carry-on luggage was 
created because of the fee on checked luggage, which pushed more 
consumers to substitute checked luggage for carry-ons.57 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 Ellison, supra note 28, at 590. 
54 Id. at 604–05. 
55 Press Release, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, PS11237-PS11272—Ryanair 
e Wizz Air, La Nuova Policy Bagagli a Mano Inganna i Consumatori Sul Prezzo del Biglietto (Feb. 21, 
2019), http://www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2019/2/Ryanair-e-Wizz-Air-la-nuova-policy-
bagagli-a-mano-inganna-i-consumatori-sul-prezzo-del-biglietto. For a discussion in English of this press 
release, see, e.g., Ryanair, Wizzair Fined in Italy Over Cabin Bag Policy, FRANCE 24 (Feb. 2, 2019), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20190221-ryanair-wizzair-fined-italy-over-cabin-bag-policy. 
56 L’a Autorrità Garante della Concorrenza del Mercato, Nella Sua Adunanza [Meeting minutes of 
The Competition and Market Guarantee Authority] (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.agcm.it/dotcmsdoc/ 
allegati-news/PS11272scorr-sanzomi.pdf. 
57 Empirical studies on the operational implications of baggage fees provide mix evidence about 
the correlation between luggage fees and delays. Early studies by Mariana Nicolae et al., Do Bags Fly 
Free? An Empirical Analysis of the Operational Implications of Airline Baggage Fees, 63 MGMT. SCI. 
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The opportunity for fraud is exacerbated by opacity and further price 
discrimination. Companies charge different prices based on whether the 
checked bag is the first or second bag,58 or whether the bag fee is paid at 
home, at the airport, or at the gate.59 These practices are aimed at leveraging 
consumer preferences and lock-in effects. Once consumers purchase an 
airline ticket, the airline does not compete with other airlines and can charge 
more for add-ons. 
One court in Spain viewed such practice as an unlawful unbundling. 
They ruled that unbundling was “abusive as it curtails the rights that the 
passenger has recognized by [article 97 of the Air Navigation Law], 
generating an imbalance of benefits between the contracting parties to the 
detriment of the consumer.”60 The court distinguished checked and 
unchecked luggage, stating that “‘hand luggage or unchecked luggage’ is 
said to be an ‘essential element of air transport so companies are obliged to 
carry it without demanding any type of extra charge on top of the price of the 
                                                                                                                           
 
3147 (2016) and by Davide Scotti et al., Baggage Fees, Operational Performance and Customer 
Satisfaction in the US Air Transport Industry, 55 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 139 (2016) have found that 
baggage fees led to a decrease in the number of flight delays. However, Amirhossein A. Yazdi et al., 
Airline Baggage Fees and Flight Delays: A Floor Wax and Dessert Topping?, 104 TRANSP. RSCH. PART 
E: LOGISTICS & TRANSP. REV. 83 (2017) found that their findings were problematic because Nicolae et 
al. used departure delays instead of arrival delays and Scotti et al. used aggregate data, which did not allow 
to control for a number of other source of delays. Instead, Yazdi et al. found that baggage fees led to an 
increase in flight delays but that these delays have been improving over time. For anecdotal evidence, see 
Martha C. White, Airlines to Charge for Second Bag, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2008), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2008/04/22/business/22bags.html (discussing how the new policy of charging for the second 
checked bag will “encourage people to lug more stuff onto the plane” as a carry-on). 
58 For example, American Airline charges $30 for the first checked bag, $40 for the second checked 
bag, $150 for the third checked bag, and $200 for the fourth and beyond checked bag. American Airlines, 
Checked Bag Policy (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.aa.com/i18n/travel-info/baggage/checked-baggage-
policy.jsp. The price change cannot be explained based on cost. For example, if a couple checks in one 
bag each, they would pay $30 twice or $60; however, if one person in the couple checks both bags under 
their name, this person pays $30 for the first and $40 for the second bag or $70 total. 
59 For example, Ryanair charges “€/£25 if purchased during the initial flight booking, or €/£40 if 
added online after booking via the Manage my Booking facility, a Ryanair call centre or airport ticket 
desk.” These different prices are price discrimination where the airline company leverages its greater 
bargaining power after the booking (i.e., the consumers are locked-in and cannot shop anymore). Ryanair, 
Baggage Policy, https://www.ryanair.com/us/en/plan-trip/flying-with-us/baggage-policy (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2020). 
60 Alicia Kember, Madrid Court Orders Ryanair to Pay Back Hand Luggage Charge to Passenger, 
EL PAIS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/11/21/inenglish/1574341370_785223 
.html (the English version of this article was written by Ms. Kember). 
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ticket.’”61 The court viewed passenger travel and their hand luggage as one 
and the same. 
The issue is not necessarily about unbundling, but about opacity. 
Transparency would create a more competitive market. Some U.S. 
policymakers proposed policies to discourage excessive pricing and to 
encourage transparency, which were never implemented.62 In the end, the 
bargaining position between consumers and airlines continue to grow 
because these companies can leverage information asymmetries. 
Arguably, the change in fine print can only be exploited for a short 
period of time—if consumers are rational. A given consumer learns the true 
cost of a fare through experience. However, the airlines can deploy a mixed 
strategy that does not let consumers adapt (e.g., Edgeworth cycle); they have 
market power over certain destinations, and new naïve consumers start 
shopping for airfares every day.63 In the meantime, some consumers could 
be heavily penalized. 
                                                                                                                           
 
61 Id. 
62 See, e.g., Helaine Olen, How a Low-level Decision on Baggage Fees Spotlights the Worst of 
Trump, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/12/12/ 
how-a-low-level-decision-on-baggage-fees-spotlights-the-worst-of-trump/?noredirect=on&utmterm= 
.c9e1e0bd6885; Jon Delano, Pa. AG Protests Repeal of Rules Protecting Consumers on Airline Baggage 
Fees, CBS PITTSBURGH (Dec. 19, 2017), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/12/19/airline-baggage-fee-
rule-pennsylvania-attorney-general/; A.W., Why the Trump Administration Has Enraged Flyers Across 
America, ECONOMIST (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.economist.com/gulliver/2017/12/11/why-the-trump-
administration-has-enraged-flyers-across-america; David Shepardson, Trump Administration Opposes 
Requiring ‘Reasonable’ Airline Baggage Fees, REUTERS (May 25, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-usa-airlines-regulation/trump-administration-opposes-requiring-reasonable-airline-baggage-
fees-idUSKCN1IQ2XH. 
63 A lawsuit against American Airlines alleged that the airline breached its contractual obligations 
when charging consumers baggage fees after promising a free first checked bag. The lawsuit was 
eventually settled. A jury will never be able to rule on these claims. “[W]ithout admitting or conceding 
any wrongdoing . . . American [Airlines] consents to the Settlement and to certification of a class action 
for settlement purposes only, solely to avoid the expense, inconvenience and inherent risk of litigation as 
well as continued disruption of its business operations.” See Settlement Agreement and Release in 
Bazerman v. Am. Airlines, No. 1:17-cv-11297-WGY (D. Mass. 2018). In this case, the plaintiff wanted 
an injunction to stop the airline from charging passenger a bag fee if they were promised otherwise. This 
injunction could seem overzealous: another alleged victim could raise the case in court again. But an 
injunction would be more easily enforced than having new costumers bringing another lawsuit. See also 
Karen Kidd, Judge Approves Harvard Professor’s Settlement with American Airlines Over Baggage Fees; 
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Using competition law could be maladapted to this opacity problem. 
Courts have been worried that forcing unbundling to protect consumers and 
changing the consumer’s bargaining power would not be sufficient to protect 
consumer welfare. Companies could still exploit information asymmetries to 
extract supra-competitive profits. For example, in United States v. Loew’s 
Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court looked at the practice of block-booking, a 
bundling of different movies together and sold as a package.64 The Court 
found that some block-booking arrangements violated the antitrust laws 
because they negated the ability of theaters to negotiate for individual movie 
licenses.65 The Court did not bar bundling but instead required that 
companies offered the goods separately if it wanted to offer them as a 
bundle.66 
The district court worried that unbundling alone would not be sufficient 
because the products could still be constructively bundled.67 At the urging of 
the government, the Supreme Court went even further. It required that the 
prices for individual goods and their bundle be provided together to the 
consumers. The Court worried that withholding individual pricing would 
create information asymmetries and uneven bargaining power that the 
bundler could leverage.68 
This decision69 illustrates the risk and unintended consequences of 
forcing unbundling. Pricing schemes become more complicated every day 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 40 (1962). 
65 Id. at 40–44. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 43 (“(C) Entering into any agreement to sell or license the right to exhibit any feature film 
over any television station in which the differential between the price or fee for such feature film when 
sold or licensed alone and the price or fee for the same film when sold or licensed with one or more other 
film [sic] has the effect of conditioning the sale or license of such film upon the sale or license of one or 
more other films.”). 
68 Id. at 53–54 (“This subtler form of sales pressure, though not accompanied by any observable 
delay over time, might well result in some television stations buying the block rather than trying to talk 
the seller into negotiating on an individual basis. Requiring the production of the individual list on first 
approach will obviate this danger.”). 
69 Part of Loew’s and its predecessor United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) 
(holding that block booking and vertical integration were anti-competitive) were later partly overturned 
because the Court assumed market power based on copyright instead of investigating it. In Illinois Tool 
Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., the Court “conclude[d] that tying arrangements involving patented 
products should be evaluated under the standards applied in cases like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish 
rather than under the per se rule applied in Morton Salt and Loew’s.” Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006). 
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and companies are leveraging consumers’ limited ability to predict their 
consumption or do the expected calculus. Consumer protection laws may 
prove a better route than competition laws when dealing with information 
asymmetries. The next section discusses how unbundling can be used to 
decrease competition by locking consumers into a differentiated product. 
C. Unbundling to Product Differentiate 
Unbundling is a form of price discrimination. It allows companies to 
charge different consumer types different prices. Some forms of price 
discriminations are unlawful but have been narrowly read.70 The Robinson-
Patman Act71 amended the Clayton Antitrust Act of 191472 and prohibits 
some price discrimination.73 In FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,74 the Supreme Court 
looked at price discrimination and required four elements: (1) different prices 
for goods75 (2) of “like grade and quality”76 (3) which affects competition77 
and (4) interstate commerce.78 In other words, most forms of price 
discrimination would not violate antitrust laws. 
However, as the model above shows unbundling increases price and 
indirectly decreases competition through product differentiation and lock-in 
effects. Companies can use bundling and unbundling to differentiate their 
products.79 Product differentiation has two main effects. First, product 
differentiation makes comparison of product and service more difficult.80 In 
turn, because comparison is more difficult, companies gain market power and 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in 
Modern Economies: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1269–72 (2010) (discussing 
the diminished enforcement of price discrimination in the U.S.). 
71 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). 
72 Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; Clayton Antitrust Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2). 
74 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). 
75 Id. at 42–43. 
76 Id. at 45. 
77 Id. at 45–47. 
78 Id. at 49 (“Congress intended to protect a merchant from competitive injury attributable to 
discriminatory prices on any or all goods sold in interstate commerce . . . .”). 
79 See Hui-Ling Chung et al., Bundling Strategy and Product Differentiation, 108 J. ECON. 207 
(2013) (modeling how product differentiation and competition affects the incentive to bundle). 
80 See, e.g., CHURCH & WARE, supra note 31, at 258 (looking at the theory of product 
differentiation); Olen, supra note 62 (discussing baggage fee and how “airlines and travel websites don’t 
exactly make it easy for us consumers to do price comparisons”). 
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the ability to charge supra-competitive prices.81 This indirectly decreases 
competition by raising cost of comparing products to consumers. 
Product differentiation has ambiguous effect on societal welfare. On the 
one hand, consumers can benefit because they get a product that more closely 
resembles their needs. On the other hand, since the products or services are 
not directly comparable, consumers would have to expend resources to 
decide which product to consume. Since information is costly, consumers 
gather information only if the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal cost. 
If the information costs outweigh the gain from having a better suited 
product, product differentiation negatively affects societal welfare. 
For example, some airlines like Southwest Airlines82 still have a 
bundling policy while others, such as American Airlines,83 do not. Southwest 
used this difference to its advantage to differentiate their services. In its 
advertisements, Southwest compares its ancillary fee policy to other 
companies.84 This difference creates an added step for consumers to compare 
the two propositions. 
Second, product differentiation allows companies to manipulate 
consumers’ perception. Companies can leverage their bundling/unbundling 
strategies to frame their proposition differently. Many consumers are risk-
averse and sensitive to framing.85 Johnson et al. found that consumers 
respond more positively to discounts when unbundled as a gain.86 As such, 
framing the offering can help manipulate consumer purchasing behavior 
without benefits to society. Framing bundling and unbundling can help veil 
a price increase as a discount. Companies use the information costs or the 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 CHURCH & WARE, supra note 31, at 258–63. 
82 Southwest, Optional Travel Charges (2020), https://www.southwest.com/html/customer-
service/travel-fees.html. 
83 American Airlines, Checked Bag Policy (2020), https://www.aa.com/i18n/travel-info/baggage/ 
checked-baggage-policy.jsp. 
84 Jonathan Chew, Southwest’s New Ad Mocks Other Airlines’ Fees, FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/10/08/southwest-ad-fees/. 
85 The field of behavioral economics has documented these issues. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251 
(1989); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, 
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). 
86 Michael D. Johnson et al., The Effects of Price Bundling on Consumer Evaluations of Product 
Offerings, 16 INT’L J. RES. IN MKTG. 129, 140 (1999). 
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consumers’ naivety to rent-seek. The unbundling strategy further adds to the 
opacity of the market. 
Lock-in occurs when the consumers cannot switch sellers without 
incurring a switching cost. For example, a passenger cannot send their 
luggage with a different airline without paying for the flight itself. If 
consumers can anticipate future needs, then companies are not able to 
leverage the switching costs. But, in some cases, (myopic) consumers may 
be unable to predict their future needs or their future expenditure on add-
ons.87 Companies can exploit myopic consumers and their short-sightedness. 
Companies can increase profit through unbundling to make the true cost of 
consumption opaquer.88 
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., the U.S. 
Supreme Court made a rare acknowledgement that consumers can be myopic 
but may not be fully rational.89 This case involved a refusal to deal: Kodak 
refused to sell its parts to independent service organizations providing repair 
services.90 The suit was brought under a tying arrangement theory that Kodak 
was attempting to monopolize the market for repairs—the tied good market.91 
Kodak argued that it lacked sufficient market power in the tying product 
market (i.e., the copier).92 
In this rare occasion, the Court considered the information costs and the 
impact on consumer behavior. The Supreme Court wrote: 
Given the potentially high cost of information and the possibility that a seller may 
be able to price discriminate between knowledgeable and unsophisticated 
consumers, it makes little sense to assume, in the absence of any evidentiary 
support, that equipment-purchasing decisions are based on an accurate assessment 
of the total cost of equipment, service, and parts over the lifetime of the machine.93 
This case was a tying arrangement case. The parts and services were tied 
together. Because Kodak controlled the parts, they controlled the service. It 
is a rare occasion when the U.S. Supreme Court deviated from the rational 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q.J. ECON. 505, 507 (2006) (modeling add-ons and unbundling 
and how companies can leverage some consumers’ myopia for profit). 
88 Id. at 510. 
89 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 468, 495 (1992). 
90 Id. at 455. 
91 Id. at 465. 
92 Id. at 466–67. 
93 Id. at 475–76. 
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consumer hypothesis. If consumers were rational (i.e., informed and able to 
predict future consumption), they would have selected their copier based on 
the total cost over its lifetime. This total cost would have included the part 
and service fees (i.e., the add-ons). The Court recognized that not all 
consumers were sophisticated. It also recognized that companies could 
leverage information costs to extract supra-competitive profits (including in 
the form of lock-ins) by tying product and services. 
Kodak argues that the tying product is the printer where it had no market 
power (i.e. the ex-ante purchasing decision) whereas the Court viewed the 
part as the tying product (i.e. the ex-post purchasing decision). 
This case can also be viewed as an unbundling case. Traditionally, 
companies had offered warranties for parts and labor. Therefore, consumers 
would see the price of a good and would know its cost over its lifetime or at 
least the duration of the warranty (e.g., a two-year warranty). Companies 
were the least cost risk spreader. However, companies viewed an opportunity 
for an add-on and additional profits. Many companies now sell warranties 
separately at the time of purchase. 
This case illustrates a situation where a sophisticated consumer could 
have figured out the total cost of the initial product and its add-ons. However, 
in some situations, this total cost cannot be estimated. Lock-ins through 
product differentiation relates to the opacity that companies may try to 
cultivate to profit. 
D. Unbundling to Defeat the Principal-Agent Problem 
Unbundling necessary complements have produced unintended and 
harmful consequences. In the service industry, unbundling was created to 
address the principal-agent problem but lead to worse problems. 
The principal agent problem (or agency problem) refers to incentive 
misalignment associated with the separation of decision making and benefit 
receiving.94 On the one hand, the principal benefits from the agent’s action 
and wants the agent to maximize the principal’s well-being. On the other 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
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hand, the agent controls its own actions, and its self-interest may be 
maximized with actions that do not maximize the principal’s well-being. 
A principal can address this problem by (1) monitoring the agent,95 
(2) bonding the two interests (e.g., incentive contract, bonuses),96 or (3) using 
external market devices.97 For simplicity and cost, some employers have 
delegated the monitoring to third parties such as other employees or 
consumers.98 These same employers have blended the bonding system and 
external market devices to reward employees based on their performance and 
realign the agent’s interest with the principal’s interest. 
For example, the U.S. restaurant industry has unbundled the foods from 
the service (partially) to defeat the principal-agent problem. Most U.S. 
restaurants pay their wait staff below minimum wage, and the employees rely 
on tips for their income. 
The unbundling ensures that tipped employees are incentivized to 
provide a better service than if they received a flat wage regardless of service 
quality. In this system, the consumer monitors the employee and rewards the 
employee based on observed service.99 The argument rests on who is the least 
cost monitor: the employer (i.e., the principal beneficiary) or the client (i.e., 
third-party beneficiary). 
However, this unbundling and incentive system have been criticized. 
Tipping may not solve the principal-agent problem as intended. First, a 
rational consumer should not tip. After all, a consumer has already received 
                                                                                                                           
 
95 Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics (John M. Olin Program in L. and Econ., 
Working Paper No. 92, 2000) (“Now, one possibility is to monitor the agent and fire her if she does not 
do a good enough job.”). 
96 See, e.g., Canice Prendergast, The Provision of Incentives in Firms, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 7, 
7 (1999) (reviewing the literature on incentives and stating that incentive mechanisms “include piece rates, 
options, discretionary bonuses, promotions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, deferred compensation, and 
so on”). 
97 See generally Gary J. Miller, Solutions to principal-agent problems in firms, HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 349 (2005) (discussing different solutions to the principal-agent problem). 
98 See, e.g., Roland Strausz, Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship, 64 REV. 
ECON. STUDIES 337 (1997) (comparing monitoring to third-party monitoring); Hal R. Varian, Monitoring 
Agents with Other Agents, 146 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 153 (1990) (building a model of agent 
monitoring using the example of the Grameen Bank); Marc Knez & Duncan Simester, Firm-Wide 
Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 743 (2001) (discussing how 
financial bonus can incentivize employees to cross-monitor). 
99 See generally Ofer H. Azar, Incentives and Service Quality in the Restaurant Industry: The 
Tipping-Service Puzzle, 41 APPLIED ECON. 1917 (2009). 
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the service and has discretion on the payment. Repeated interaction and 
reputation may explain some tipping behavior; but the rational consumer 
should deviate and cheat the waiter out of its true willingness-to-pay for 
service.100 
Tipping still constantly occurs in single occurrence interactions. Tipping 
may reflect more the consumers’ feelings than the quality of the service 
received. “[N]ot tipping might result in psychological disutility due to 
negative feelings such as embarrassment, unfairness, guilt, and 
dishonesty.”101 Even bad services may be rewarded.102 Consumers tip mainly 
to show gratitude or conform to social norms.103 
Second, the unbundling of service and food created a bonus system that 
some consumers have abused. The waitstaff’s reliance on tipping for their 
livelihood has empowered some consumers to misbehave. Waitstaff may not 
flag consumers’ bad behavior for fear of not receiving any compensation or 
being let go.104 
Finally, another unintended consequence of unbundling service and 
food is tax evasion.105 Waiters are supposed to report their tips as earnings, 
but waiters constantly underreport based on the restaurant market size.106 
Some U.S. policymakers are investigating whether to increase the minimum 
wage for tipped workers, which could lead to the re-bundling of food and 
service.107 
                                                                                                                           
 
100 Ofer H. Azar, Business Strategy and the Social Norm of Tipping, 32 J. ECON. PSYCH. 515, 516 
(2011). 
101 Ofer H. Azar, Strategic Behavior and Social Norms in Tipped Service Industries, 8 B.E. J. ECON. 
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2008) (building a tipping model that includes a disutility from diverging from the 
social norm). 
102 Hugh Morris, America’s Tipping Culture is Out of Control—Why Should Visitors be Forced to 
Reward Bad Service?, TELEGRAPH (June 15, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/comment/ 
tipping-in-american-out-of-hand/. 
103 See, e.g., Ofer H. Azar, Tipping Motivations and Behavior in the U.S. and Israel, 40 J. APPLIED 
SOC. PSYCH. 421 (2010) (surveying the reasons for tipping); H. Wesley Perkins & Alan D. Berkowitz, 
Perceiving the Community Norms of Alcohol Use Among Students: Some Research Implications for 
Campus Alcohol Education Programming, 21 INT’L J. ADDICTIONS 961 (1986) (discussing the influence 
of perceived alcohol consumption on one’s own alcohol consumption). 
104 Patrick McGeehan, Amy Schumer, Amy Poehler and Other Stars Stand Up for Waitresses. The 
Response: No, Thanks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/nyregion/ 
amy-schumer-poehler-waitresses-wages.html. 
105 See Azar, supra note 99, at 1917. 
106 See id. 
107 See Azar, supra note 100, at 518. 
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In other words, the unbundling may not have solved the principal-agent 
problems. Its unintended consequences may well have worse effect on 
society than the principal-agent problem itself. The next section discusses 
how we can address some of the issues related to unbundling. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR ADDRESSING HARMFUL BUNDLING 
From Aspen Skiing to Eastman Kodak Co., the cases cited above have 
been more the exception than the rule. The U.S. Supreme Court has viewed 
most consumers as sophisticated and if not, then the sophisticated consumers 
protect the naïve consumers within the market. Unbundling has not come up 
often as an issue for the Court; nonetheless, the competition laws are 
maladapted at dealing with unbundling. 
Unbundling from a previous position of bundling may have limited 
applications. The endowment effect should make moving from bundled to 
unbundled products more difficult.108 Unbundling can be seen as a loss and 
enrage some consumers. For example, a consumer sued an airline when her 
baggage was lost after she was charged an unbundled baggage fee from her 
airfare.109 The consumer paid $25 and requested $5 million in damages.110 
The consumer claims that the suit was about “an entire industry that has lost 
touch with its customers.”111 More and more consumers see unbundling as a 
“nuisance fee”: this unbundling is not an opportunity for cheaper services 
because the fee is not related to the service cost.112 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (discussing an experiment that test the difference between 
consumers’ willingness to pay and to accept and how this willingness depends on whether the consumers 
is in possession of the object). 
109 Covarrubias v. Am. Airlines Inc., 2011 WL 13100749, Case No. C10-1158JLR (W.D. Wash. 
2011). 
110 Ray Sanchez, American Airlines Sued for $5M After Refusing $25 Lost Bag Refund, ABC NEWS 
(July 22, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/Travel/american-airlines-sued-million-refusing-25-
baggage-fee/story?id=11215965. 
111 Scott Mayerowitz & Ray Sanchez, American Airlines Disputes $5 Million Lost Bag Lawsuit, 
ABC NEWS (July 27, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/Travel/american-airlines-disputes-million-checked-
bag-fee-lawsuit/story?id=11253935. 
112 Ron Lieber, 5 Ways to Think About Nuisance Fees, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2011), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/your-money/5-new-ways-to-think-about-companies-nuisance-fees.html 
?mtrref=undefined (discussing four reasons why consumers are dissatisfied with fees unbundling: (1) fee 
to cost correlation; (2) service provider disapproval; (3) fee justification; (4) value for money). 
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However, consumers have short memories. They may forget that these 
goods or services were once bundled. They may assume that the unbundling 
is natural. Anecdotally, U.S. visitors to non-tipping countries have had a 
difficulty adapting as much as Europeans visiting the U.S. struggled to adapt 
to the tipping culture. Soon, all consumers adapt as long as the information 
is readily available. Customers can run afoul of economic reasoning as shown 
by the prevalence of the tipping culture. 
Instead, antitrust, and consumer protection, authorities should take a 
closer look at unbundling. Judges should create different presumptions based 
on the type of unbundling they face. In Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 
v. Hyde,113 Justice O’Connor wrote about “a coherent economic basis for 
treating the tying and tied products as distinct.”114 Add-ons should be viewed 
differently on whether there is a coherent economic basis for treating them 
as distinct: (1) optional add-ons would be distinct products whereas 
(2) necessary add-ons would be the same product. 
On the one hand, unbundling optional add-ons can make economic 
sense. It allows for price discrimination and product differentiation. Both 
price discrimination and product differentiation can attract consumers that 
may not have otherwise bought the product.115 So, unbundling optional add-
ons can increase societal welfare—depending on the distribution of 
consumer types. However, unbundling optional add-ons could be used to 
increase competitors’ costs and foreclose markets. So, unbundling optional 
add-ons can also decrease societal welfare. 
On the other hand, unbundling necessary add-ons make no economic 
sense. The unbundling company faces more competition if the add-on can be 
obtained separately without gaining any benefits that would not raise 
anticompetitive (or consumer protection) issues. Companies’ ability to harm 
consumers depends on their ability to increase information costs, make the 
market opaquer, and prevent others from entering the market. As such, when 
a company unbundles necessary add-ons, it reveals that it likely profits either 
through leveraging information costs or through increasing competitor costs. 
                                                                                                                           
 
113 See Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
114 Id. at 39. 
115 Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy 
Issues, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 177 (1997) (discussing the limited approach of Antitrust to product 
differentiation focusing on the effect that product differentiation can have on mergers and investment). 
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A complainant about unbundling should argue whether an add-on is 
necessary or optional. This is a question of fact that judges or juries could 
decide on a case-by-case basis.116 If the finder of fact decides that an add-on 
is necessary, then the burden of proof switches to the defendant. Unbundling 
should be presumed to be anticompetitive or in violation of consumer 
protection laws. The unbundling company should have a right to present 
evidence to defeat the presumption. For example, a company could show that 
they are unbundling to benefit consumers by offering them different versions 
of the necessary add-ons. The reason should either be pro-competition or pro-
consumer. 
If the finder of fact decides that an add-on is optional, then the plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof to show that the unbundling was anticompetitive 
by creating artificial barriers to entry. Unbundling optional add-ons has 
ambiguous welfare effects. Thus, making unbundling of optional add-ons per 
se illegal could harm society. Instead, each case needs to be investigated 
individually under a rule of reason to see whether unbundling optional add-
ons increased barriers to entry and decreased competition. 
The Supreme Court may not wish to patronize consumers and 
discourage their information gathering efforts. However, it should 
disincentivize companies from increasing information costs for consumers 
and from deterring entry. A switched burden of proof depending on the type 
of add-on could reach that aim.  
                                                                                                                           
 
116 The application of a rule of reason or a quick rule would depend on whether the product is 
considered an optional or necessary add-on respectively. Judges and juries can apply both rules once they 
decide the type of add-on they are facing. For a discussion of both rules and the associated presumption 
see Garry A. Gabison, Juries Can Quick Look Too, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 271 (2014). 
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APPENDIX 
Assume that the company faces three types of consumers: (1) low type; 
(2) sophisticated high type; and (3) naïve high types. 
Low type consumers only purchase the initial good. These consumers 
always buy from the company offering the cheapest initial good: the 
consumer buys from firm i if p1i < p1j, where p1i is the price of good 1 from 
firm i and p1j is the price of good 1 from firm j. 
High type consumers consider purchasing one unit of both goods. 
Sophisticated consumers look at the bundle price (i.e., the price of the initial 
product and its add-ons together). Naïve consumers only compare the price 
of the initial product and then they decide to purchase the add-on after being 
locked in. 
The presence of low type consumers makes the pricing below cost of 
the first good less likely, but it does not change the reasoning. Without loss 
of generality, the three type of consumers are assumed to be present in society 
on an equal ratio. 
The demand for firm i’s products Di (p1i, p2i, p1j, p2j) is: 
 






⎧ 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 12 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽 = 𝛽𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 < 𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽12 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 = 𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽12 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 + 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 = 𝑝  and 𝛽 = 𝛽12 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 + 𝐷 𝑝 , 𝑝 , 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 = 𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽 < 𝛽12 𝐷 𝛽 , 𝛽 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽 = 𝛽0 if 𝑝 > 𝑝  and 𝛽 > 𝛽
 
 
The cases below show that this game does not have a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium. 
● Case 1: if p1i > p1j > c1, then the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. All of firm i’s demand 
Di (p1i, p2i, p1j, p2j) depends on the quantity demanded by 
sophisticated high type consumers. 
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○ Case 1.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, all the consumers prefer to 
purchase from firm j. Firm j has some positive profits while 
firm i makes zero profit. So, firm i would be better off 
decreasing its prices for either good 1 p1i or the bundle βi 
below firm j’s prices to try to capture some demand and make 
some positive profits. 
○ Case 1.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. Firm i makes zero 
profit. Firm i would be better off undercutting firm j on good 
1 to capture some of the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers. Simultaneously, firm j would be better off 
increasing its prices for either good 1 p1i or the bundle βi. 
○ Case 1.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Both firms would be better off 
undercutting the current bundle price to capture the whole 
sophisticated high type demand. Firm i would also be better 
off undercutting the price for the first good p1j to capture the 
low type and the naïve high type demand. 
○ Case 1.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Firm i would be better off 
decreasing the price for good 1 while keeping the bundle price 
unchanged. Firm i would be able to capture some of the low 
type and the naïve high type demand. Firm j would also be 
better off increasing the price of good 1. 
○ Other cases (βj > βi > c1 + c2 and βj > βi = c1 + c2) are not 
discussed because they are symmetric to previous cases 
(respectively 1.1 and 1.2). 
● Case 2: if p1i > p1j = c1, then the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. All of firm i’s demand 
Di (p1i, p2i, p1j, p2j) depends on the quantity demanded by 
sophisticated high type consumers. 
○ Case 2.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. Both firms could be 
better off by charging different prices. 
■ Firm i makes zero profit. It can increase its profit by 
undercutting βj. It would capture the whole 
sophisticated high type consumer demand. 
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■ Firm j would also be better off increasing its prices 
for either good 1 p1j or the bundle βj. It would retain 
the whole consumer demand and make more profits. 
○ Case 2.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. Firm i cannot do 
better by deviating alone but firm j can. Firm j makes zero 
profit and would be better off increasing its prices for either 
good 1 or the bundle or both. 
○ Case 2.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Both firms could be better off 
undercutting the current bundle price to attract the whole 
sophisticated high type demand. Firm j would be better of 
increasing the price of good 1 while keeping the bundle price 
constant. Depending on the relative number of sophisticated 
to naïve high types, firm j could be better off increasing the 
price good 2: it loses the (half) demand from sophisticated 
consumers but makes more profits from the naïve consumers. 
○ Case 2.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. At these prices, firm j has an 
incentive to deviate because it can increase its profits by 
increasing the price for the good 1. Firm j loses the 
sophisticated high type consumers but it would increase its 
profit on the low type and the naïve high type demand. Firm j 
could also increase the price of good 2. It loses the 
sophisticated high type consumers, but it increases its profit 
from naïve high type consumers. 
■ Note that depending on the relative number of low 
to high types, firm i could be better with a lost leader 
on good 1 and profits on good 2. Loss leader is 
discussed in more details in case 4 & 5. 
○ Other cases (βj > βi > c1 + c2 and βj > βi = c1 + c2) are not 
discussed because they are symmetric to previous cases 
(respectively 2.1 and 2.2). 
● Case 3: if p1i = p1j > c1, then the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers split between the two firms. Sophisticated high type 
consumers compare the bundle prices. 
○ Case 3.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j. Firm i makes some 
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profits but it could increase its profit by decreasing its prices 
for good 1. 
○ Case 3.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j but the firm makes 
no profit from these consumers. Both firms could be better off 
deviating alone: both could increase its profit by undercutting 
the competition for good 1. Firm j would also be better off 
increasing its prices for the bundle through increasing the 
price for good 2 while decreasing the price of good 1. 
○ Case 3.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the demand. 
Both firms could be better off undercutting the current price 
for good 1 or undercutting the current bundle price to attract 
the whole sophisticated high type demand or both. If either 
were to undercut the price for good 1, they could achieve both 
it could increase its profits. 
○ Case 3.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand but make zero economic profit 
from these consumers. At these prices, either firm increases 
its profits by decreasing the price of good 1 p1 marginally to 
try to capture the whole demand from the low type and the 
naïve high type consumers. However, such a firm would also 
need to increase the price of good 2 to ensure the firm does 
not lose money on the sophisticated high types. 
○ Other cases (βj > βi > c1 + c2 and βj > βi = c1 + c2) are not 
discussed because they are symmetric to previous cases 
(respectively 3.1 and 3.2). 
● Case 4: if p1i ≥ c1 > p1j, then the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers purchase from firm j. In such a situation, firm j decides 
to use the first good as a lost leader. All of firm i’s demand Di (p1i, 
p2i, p1j, p2j) depends on the quantity demanded by sophisticated 
high type consumers, N. 
○ Case 4.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, all the consumers prefer to 
purchase from firm j. Firm i makes zero profit whereas firm j 
could be positive or negative profits depending on the 
consumer type distribution. Firm i would be better off 
decreasing its prices for the bundle βi until βj > βi > c1 + c2 to 
try to capture some demand from sophisticated high type 
consumers. 
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○ Case 4.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j and firm j has 
negative profits: it makes no profit on the high types and loses 
money on the low types. Firm j would be better exiting the 
market or charging p1j = c1 and βj = c1 + c2 where it would 
make zero profits. 
○ Case 4.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Firm i makes positive profits 
whereas firm j’s profit could be positive, negative or zero. 
Firm j makes some profits on the high types but loses money 
on the low types. Firm i would be better off undercutting the 
current bundle price to attract all the sophisticated high type 
consumers. Firm j could be better off undercutting the bundle 
price as well but it is less clear. Decreasing the bundle price 
affects both the marginal profits from sophisticated and naïve 
high type consumers. If sophisticated high types sufficiently 
outnumber naïve high types, firm j could be better off 
undercutting firm i on the bundle. 
○ Case 4.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Firm j is earning negative profits 
because it loses money on the low type and makes no money 
on the high type. Firm j would be better exiting the market or 
charging p1j = c1 and βj = c1 + c2 where it would make zero 
profits. 
○ Case 4.5: if βj > βi > c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i. Firm i makes some 
profits but would be better off increasing its prices for the 
bundle βi. Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types 
but loses money on the low types. Firm j would be better off 
increasing the price for product 1. 
○ Case 4.6: if βj > βi = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i but firm i makes no 
profit. It would be better off increasing the bundle price βi. 
Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types but loses 
money on the low types. Firm j would be better off increasing 
the price for product 1. 
● Case 5: if c1 > p1i > p1j, then the low type and the naïve high type 
consumers purchase from firm j. In such a situation, firm j decides 
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to use the first good as a lost leader. All of firm i’s demand Di (p1i, 
p2i, p1j, p2j) depends on the quantity demanded by sophisticated 
high type consumers. 
○ Case 5.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, all the consumers prefer to 
purchase from firm j. Firm i makes zero profit whereas firm j 
could be positive or negative profits depending on the 
consumer type distribution. So, firm i would be better off 
decreasing its price for the bundle to try to capture some 
demand. Firm i would make some positive profits. 
○ Case 5.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j and firm j has 
negative profits: it makes no profit on the high types and loses 
money on the low types. Firm j would be better exiting the 
market or charging both goods at cost where it would make 
zero profits. 
○ Case 5.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Firm i makes positive profits 
whereas firm j’s profit could be positive, negative or zero. 
Firm j makes some profits on the high types but loses money 
on the low types. Firm i would be better off undercutting the 
current bundle price to attract all the sophisticated high type 
consumers. Firm j could be better off undercutting as well 
depending on the distribution of high types. 
○ Case 5.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. Firm j is earning negative profits 
because it loses money on the low type and makes no money 
on the high type. Firm j would be better exiting the market or 
charging at cost. 
○ Case 5.5: if βj > βi > c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i. Firm i makes some 
profits but would be better off increasing its prices for the 
bundle βi. Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types 
but loses money on the low types. Firm j would be better off 
increasing the price for product 1. 
○ Case 5.6: if βj > βi = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i but firm i makes no 
profit. It would be better off increasing the bundle price βi. 
Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types but loses 
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money on the low types. Firm j would be better off increasing 
the price for product 1. 
● Case 6: if p1i = p1j = c1, then the firms split the demand from the 
low type and the naïve high type consumers. The firms make no 
profit from the low type. Their profits depend on the high types. 
○ Case 6.1: if βi > βj > c1 + c2, all the consumers prefer to 
purchase from firm j. Firm i makes zero profit whereas firm j 
makes positive profits. Firm j would prefer increasing the 
price of the bundle to capture more profit. Depending on the 
distribution of naïve to sophisticated high types, firm i could 
be better off decreasing its prices for the bundle to capture 
some sophisticated high demand. 
○ Case 6.2: if βi > βj = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm j and firm j makes no 
profits. Firm j would be better increasing the bundle price. 
○ Case 6.3: if βi = βj > c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. They both make positive profits. 
They both would be better off undercutting the current bundle 
price to attract all the sophisticated high type consumers. 
○ Case 6.4: if βi = βj = c1 + c2, firms i and j split the sophisticated 
high type consumer demand. They both make no profits. 
Either firm would be better off increasing the price of good 2. 
Such a strategy leads to the firm making zero profit on the low 
type consumers that selects select their product and some 
positive profits on the naïve high type consumers while the 
sophisticated high type consumers would buy from the other 
firm. 
○ Case 6.5: if βj > βi > c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i. Firm i makes some 
profits but would be better off increasing its prices for the 
bundle. Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types. 
Firm j would be better off increasing the price for product 2. 
○ Case 6.6: if βj > βi = c1 + c2, the sophisticated high type 
consumers prefer to purchase from firm i but firm i makes no 
profit. It would be better off increasing the price of good 2. 
Firm j makes some profits on the naïve high types but it would 
be better of increasing the price for product 2. 
